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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
·lt

-~

RENNOLD PENDER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 7344

R. L. BIRD and MAE C. BIRD, his
wife, et al.
Defendants and Respondents,

Brief of Appellant
I.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A-PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL
This appeal arises through a suit instituted by plaintiff
and appellant in the district court of Salt Lake County, Utah
for the quieting of title to certain real property situated on
South Main Street, in Salt Lake City, Utah, in which action
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plaintiff and appellant named as defendants, R. L. Bird
and Mae C. Bird, his wife, who claim title to said property
by virtue of a County tax deed ( Tr. 2) and also by virtue
oi a deed from Salt Lake City Corporation issued by virtue
of a sale of the property for special assessments, (Tr. 5).
The property has a 50 foot frontage on Main Street and is
situated near the corner of Seventh South Street and is 80
feet in depth.
Plaintiff and appellant named Frank B. Bowers and
Winifred S. Bowers, his wife, as parties defendant in
addition to respondents. Frank B. Bowers and wife answered plaintiff's complaint denying the allegation of ownership in plaintiff and claiming fee simple title to the property
described in the complaint in themselves ( Rec. 59 to 61
incl.). Attention is directed to the fact that these defendants
appeared on their own behalf and not on behalf of Bowers
Investment Company, a corporation, which corporation was
the record owner of the property in 1928 through which
plaintiff and appellant claims title in fee.
Defendants Frank B. Bowers and Winifred S. Bowers
have since the conclusion of the trial of said cause and
since the entry of judgment by the trial court, disclaimed all
right, title and interest in and to the premises described in
appellant's complaint, together with any and all rights they
or either of them have under their affirmative defense or
counterclaim as against either the appellant or respondents
Birds (Rec. 106), therefore this appeal is not being prosecuted as against defendants Bowers.
The property affected by this action is now and has been
at all times unimproved vacant property and not enclosed

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

\
I

~ill

isaJ!l

; ]9~
. ~a
I

~~~

o~e

oou
ilie

eac

me

wh

tne

ln1

ilit

an

an

~

al

B

''I

!11!1

3
with a fence t Tr. 53), which condition existed until tax title to
same was acquired by defendants and respondents Bird in
1945 when respondents caused an advertising sign or bill
board to be placed upon said property and at which time
plaintiff and appellant placed a tenant in possession who
operated a used car lot thereon, (Tr. 53 and 54). Thus
both appellant and respondents claimed actual possession of
the property from 1945 to the date of trial of said cause,
each making use of the property subsequent to the year 1945.
Fee simple title to the property vested in Bowers Investment Company, a corporation of Utah, in 1928 (Tr. 2)
which corporation was in 1928 and has been at all times
thereafter, a corporation in good standing (Tr. 57). Bowers
Investment Company, a corporation was not made a party to
the action either by the original complaint filed by plaintiff
and appellant, by the answers and counterclaims of defendants and respondents, nor by the complaint in intervention
filed by Frank B. Bowers and his wife or the answer and
affirmative defense set up in the answer filed by said Frank
B. Bowers and wife. Neither did Bowers Investment Company intervene in the action.
B-CHAIN OF TITLE
The abstract of title offered by plaintiff and appellant
and received in evidence at the trial as plaintiff's Exhibit
"A", being a supplemental abstract of title from date of
Feb. 14th, 1928 at 4:22 p. m. shows the chain of title to
said property as follows, it having been agreed that fee
simple title in 1928 was vested in Bowers Investment Company, a corporation, the deed to said corporation is not
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contained in the abstract, however all instruments affecting
the title to said property thereafter are as follows:
Entry No. !-Certificate of sale for Special taxes to
Salt 'Lake City Corporation, dated Apr.
20, 1928 for sidewalk extension No. 217,
consideration being $87.01.
Entry No. 2-Certificate of sale for Special taxes to
Salt Lake City Corporation, dated Apr.
20, 1928 for Sidewalk extension No. 217,
consideration being $65.46.
Entry No. 3-Tax Sale, from Salt Lake County Treasurer to Salt Lake County, dated Dec. 21,
1928, consideration being $26.53, to
which sale taxes for the following years
in the following amounts were added:
1929-$33.82
1930-$24.35
1931-$24.45
1932-$28.35
1933-$31.96
1934--$32.63
Entry No. 4--Certificate of sale for special taxes to
Salt Lake City Corporation~ dated Sept.
16, 1935, for paving ext. No. 208, consideration being $1126.68.
Entry No. 5-Auditor's· Tax Deed issued to Salt Lake
County, to carry into effect the tax sale
dated Dec. 21. 1928 ( entrv No. 3 above),
dated Mar. 13, 1936, for a consideration of S25.27.
Entrv No.

6--Recorder'~

DPed issued to s~ lt LRkP· Citv,
a muhicina] ~ornoration for ~1rlPwA lk
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extenswn 1~0. ~1 ', \ entne:; 1 and ~
aoove) oeanng d.ate 01 J.Jec. ~1, l Y.Jo,
cons1aeratwn oemg .:n;ots~<±.14 covenng
tile property attected and also other
property.
Entry ~o. 7-QUit C1a1m Deed from Bowers investment Co., grantor to V. Lynn Hansen,
grantee, bearing date Oct. 6, 193 7, recorded .Feb. 14, 1938, consideration recited $10.00 etc. /. R. Stamp $.50
Entry l\o. 8-Recorder's Deed issued to Salt Lake City,
a Municipal corporation for paving extension No. 208 (entry No. 4 above)
bearing date Jan. 26, 1940, consideration being $35,714.16 covering the property affected and also other property.
Entry No. 9-Deed of Salt Lake County, toR. L. Bird,
(respondent) grantee, bearing date Sept.
5, 1945, the consideration recited being
$350.00.
Entry No. 10-Quit Claim Deed from V. Lynn Hansen
and Milia Hansen, his wife, grantors, to
Rennold Pender (appellant) hearing
date of Aug. 14th, 1945, the consideration recited being $10.00 and other good
and valuable cons.
Entry No. 11-Recorder's Deed issued to Salt Lake
City, a Municipal Corporation for paving extension No. 208 (entry No. 4
above) bearing date of Jan. 3, 1946,
consideration being $1126.68, this deed
covers only the property affected and
no other property.
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Entry No. 12-Quit Claim Deed from V. Lynn Hansen
and Milia A. Hansen, his wife, grantors
to Frank B. Bowers, grantee, bearing
date Jan. 25, 1938, the consideration
recited being $1.00, etc. I. R. Stamp
$.50. (This deed was not recorded until
Jan. 17, 1946)

if

ticl

plt
fer

Entry No. 13-Quit Claim Deed from Salt Lake City,
a Municipal corporation, grantor, to ~
L. Bird, grantee, bearing date Feb. 26,
1946, the consideration recited being
$910.00 which deed covers the property
affected and other property.

acl
on

ap
ag
an
an

C-RESPONDENTS' TITLE DEFECTS
The county tax deed shown at entry No. 5 of the abstract
is defective in that there was no Auditor's Affidavit attached
to the assessment rolls for the year 1928, the year for which
the property was sold for taxes (Tr. 5), this being one of the
deeds upon which respondents rely for their title to the property. The other source of title on which respondents rely for
their title is the Recorder's Deeds covering the special assessments levied by Salt Lake City Corporation.
Defendants and respondents introduced no evidence at
the trial showing title passing to Salt Lake City Corporation
by virtue of delinquent special assessments (Tr. 66), nor did
respondents prove the regularity of the proceedings leading
up to the sale of the property for special assessments (Tr.
66).
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7
D-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Respondents contended at the trial of the case that even
if the county tax deed was defective, respondents were entitled to prevail under the statutes of limitation which were
pleaded by defendants and respondents as an affirmative defense and counterclaim to plaintiff's complaint. (Tr. 7).
As to respondents' contention it is pointed out that the
action from which this appeal is taken was filed by appellant
on October 14th, 1947, that it is the second action filed by
appellant for the quieting of title to the property affected, and
against respondents. The, first action was filed by plaintiff
and appellant on May 9th, 1947 in which action defendants
and respondents Birds were named parties defendants with
other defendants, and in said complaint appellant named also
all other persons unknown claiming any right, title, estate
or interest in or lein upon the real property described in the
complaint adverse to plaintiff's ownership or clouding plaintiff's title thereto, as parties defendant. This first action did
not include Frank B. Bowers and Winnifred S. Bowers, his
wife, as parties defendants however.
As has heretofore been said, the first action herein referred to was filed in the office of the County Clerk of Salt
Lake ·County, Utah, by plaintiff on May 9th, 1947, which
was four days before the effective date of Sec. 104-2-5.10,
Laws of Utah, 1947. The first action was dismissed without
having been tried on its merits ( Rec. 39). This allegation
contained in plaintiff's complaint was admitted by defendants'
Birds by their answer, paraghaph 2 (Rec. 43). However, at
the trial of the case, respondents urged that plaintiff and
appellant was not saved by Sec. 104-2-41 U.C.A. 1943 hecause of the fact that plaintiff and appellant brought Frank
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B. Bowers and his wife into the second action, and that they
were not made parties to the first action, although it was the
same property involved in the action and respondents Bird
were named parties defendant in both actions. Even if such
contention were sound, and we think it is not, respondents
waved such objection through their admission in their answer.
Defendants and Respondents also rely upon the statutes
of limitation as a bar to appellant's action, having pleaded
by tlieir answer and counterclaim as a bar, Sec. 104-2-5,
104-2-5.10 UCA as added by Ch. 18 ~nd 19, Laws of Utah,
1943 as amended and Sec. 104-2-6 UCA 1943 as amended
by Laws of Utah, 1943 Ch. 20, ( Rec. 43 and 45). Plaintiff
and appellant also relies on the statute of limitation, Sec.
104-2-5, 104-2-6, 104-2-12 UCA 1943 and on Sec. 104-2-5.10
Laws of Utah, 1947, all of which appellant pleaded as a bar
to respondents' action and counterclaim, and denied by his
reply that his action was barred by the statute of limitation.

E-TRIAL PROCEEDINGS AND THE EVIDENCE
Both plaintiff and defendants and responden~s Bird filed
their motions for judgment on the pleadings in said cause
(Rec. 57) and (Rec. 63) each of which motions were argued
ora,lly before Honorable Roald A. Hogenson, and by the filing
of written briefs by each of ~aid parties,· and on June 21,
1948 Judge Hogenson denied the motion of each party ( Rec.
64).
The evidence shows, as is reflected by the abstract of
title, plaintiff's Exhibit "A", that neither Bowers Investment
Company, which company held the fee simple title in 1928,
or V. Lynn J:Iansen to whom Bowers Investment Company
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conveyed the property in 1937, nor Frank B. Bowers and·
Winnifred S. Bowers, his wife or either of them, paid taxes
on said property, either general or special, subsequent to the
year 1928 and for in excess of 17 years, all after title passed
from Bowers Investment Company to V. Lynn Hansen. It
i~ further evident that these taxes accrued to a substantial
amount of money, this without even computing interest thereon over this period of in excess of 17 years.
Defendants and respondents also rely in addition to the
statutes of limitations upon the testimony of witness V. Lynn
Hansen in order to defeat plaintiff's and appellant's title
( Tr. 64) . However not one of the instruments of record as
shown in the chain of title reflect anything but the fact that
the title to the property passed from Bowers Investment
Company to V. Lynn Hansen by deed without restrictions or
conditions attached thereto and said deed bears a documentary internal revenue stamp.
Neither is there a
word of evidence, either documentary or oral, showing
that appellant was informed of the fact that the deed which
conveyed title to V. Lynn Hansen from Bowers Investment
Company., was a mortgage only or that it was given and
taken as security. Neither did Hansen in any one of his
conversations during negotiations leading up to the delivery
by Hansen of the deed to appellant, advise appellant of
such fact. Appellant relied upon the county records when
he paid the consideration and took his deed from Hansen
(Tr. 39).
At the conclusion of the evidence, the court ruled that
title to the property was at the time of trial still in Bowers
Investment Company, that it had never passed out of that
corporation and that the deed given by that company to V.
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Lynn Hansen was only for security (Tr. 57 and 60). The
trial court further granted judgment in the matter of appellant vs Frank B. Bowers and Winnifred S. Bowers, his
wife, for no cause of action (Tr. 60).
The trial court also granted judgment in favor of respondents on the tax title shown by respondents (Tr. 68) and
awarded respondents a money judgment against appellant in
the sum of $125.00 being the amount of rental received by
appellant from the property during the period appellant had
a used car dealer in possession of the property as his tenant
(Tr. 69). Judgment was also granted to resondents for the
possession of the property (Tr. 69) the trial judge giving as
his reason for finding in favor of respondents, that appellants'
action was barred by the four year statute of limitations
(Tr. 71).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

II.
SPECIFICATION OF ERRORS
Comes now the above-named appellant, and says that
there is manifest error in the records, proceedings, and
judgment entered in this cause in this, to-wit:
l. The court erred in denying appellant's motion for
judgment on the pleadings ( Rec. 64), for the reason that
respondents' defense and counterclaim is barred by the
statute of limitations as pleaded in appellant's reply.

2. The court erred in admitting evidence on behalf of
defendants Frank B. Bowers and Winnifred S. Bowers, his
wife, which evidence was adopted by respondents as their
evidence, which evidence was timely objected to by appellant,
as follows: answer to question: (V. Lynn Hansen called by
defendants Bowers as witness) Q Did Mr. Bowers give you
anything as security for the payment of that indebtedness
(Tr. 19), for the reason that respondents by said examination
put in issue the fact that the deed given by Bowers lnv. Co.
to Hansen was in fact a mortgage and not a deed, without
having pleaded such fact.
3. The court erred in admitting evidence on behalf of
defendants Frank B. Bowers and Winnifred S. Bowers, his
wife, which evidence was adopted by respondents as their
evidence, which evidence was timely objected to by appellant,
as follows: answer to question: (V. Lynn Hansen called by
defendants Bowers as witness) Q Now that you have examined that, I will ask you if that is the paper which Mr.
Bowers gave you as security for the indebtedness (Tr. 19),
for the reason that respondents by said examination put
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in issue the fact that the deed given by Bowers Investment
Co. to Hansen was in fact a mortgage and not a deed, without
having pleaded such fact.
4. The court erred in admitting all of the testimony of
witness Hansen regarding the transaction between Hansen
and Bowers (Tr. 19 to 21 inclusive) which was timely objected to for the reason that respondents by said examination
put in issue the fact that the deed given by Bowers Investment
Co. to Hansen was in fact a mortgage and not a deed, without having pleaded such fact.
5. The court erred in sustaining respondents' objection
to appellant's request for leave to amend his reply to
respondents' answer and counterclaim by adding to paragraph 9 thereof, the following: "The defendants are estopped
from claiming title or reimbursement because of laches",
(Tr. 34 and 35) for the reason that estoppel was a good
defense to defendant's counterclaim, which defense must
be specially pleaded; appellant was entitled to the benefit
of the doctrine.
6. The court erred in admitting evidence introduced
on behalf of defendants Bowers which was adopted by respondents over a timely objection by" appellant, as follows t answer
to question: Q Mr. Pender, how much did you pay Mr.
Hansen for that? (Tr. 39) for the reason that consideration
is expressed in the deed which was in evidence and it is
presumed that is was a fair consideration, failure or insufficiency of consideration not having been put in issue
by the pleadings.
7. The court erred in its conclusions as expressed as
follows: "I think Mr. Pender has no title. I am not too
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certain that the defendant Frank Bowers has. It strikes
me that the title is in the Bowers Investment Company, that
they never gave the title away. They retained the title. The
only thing they ever gave was a security, and then Frank
Bowers tried to convert this security into a deed back to him~eIf, and he would get nothing out of it, and the title
ha~ been, is now, and always was in the Bowers Investment
Company, subject only to such rights as Mr. Hansen may
have." (Tr. 57) for the reason that Bowers Investment
Company was not a party to the action. There is no evidence
on which the court could so find and for the further reason
that the title as between Bowers Inv. Co. and Hansen was not
In Issue.
8. The court erred in its finding that the statute of
limitations barred appellants action (Tr. 71) for the reason
that such finding is not supported by the evidence, in that
there was no competent evidence to the effect that appellant's
action was barred.
9. The court erred in its refusal to adopt the Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law proposed and submitted by
appellant, for the reason that said findings of fact and
conclusions of law as proposed are in accordance with the
evidence.
10. The court erred in making and entering its findings
of fact to that portion of finding number 2, as follows: "for
the purpose of securing an obligation of the Bowers Investment Company to the said Hansen", for the reason that there
was no competent evidence
support or warrant said finding, in that there was no issue raised by the pleadings as
to any obligation existing between Bowers Investment Company and Hansen.

to
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11; The court erred in making and entering its findings
of fact number 3, for the reason that such finding is not
supported by the evidence, in that there was no competent
evidence to the effect that any obligation existed between
Bowers Investment Co. and Hansen at the time the deed
was delivered by Bowers Investment Co. to Hansen.
12. The court erred in making and entering its finding
of fact to that portion of finding number 12, as follows:
"That plaintiff knew that V. Lynn Hansen and Milia Hansen
were not the owners of the land described in finding No.
1 ; and that plantiff was not a bona fide purchaser for
value," for the reason that there was no competent evidence
to support or warrant said finding, in that there was no
issue raised by the pleadings as to lack or failure of consideration, and such finding is against the evidence.
13. The court erred in adopting respondent's conclusions
of law.
14. The court erred in overruling the motion of appellant
for a new trial, as shown on page 97 of the transcript.
15. The court erred in rendering judgment in favor of
the respondents and against the appellant, as shown on pages
94-95 of transcript.
16. The court erred in its denial of judgment in favor of
appellant and against respondent.
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III.

POINTS ARGUED BY APPELLANT
The foregoing specifications of error, will be argued
under the following propositions or points:
1. Appellant was entitled to have his motion for judgment on the pleadings granted. The statute of limitations
was no bar to appellant's action but was a bar to respondent's
defense and counter-claim.
2. The court abused its discretionary power in refusing
to permit appellant to amend his complaint at the commencement of the trial of said cause Ior the purpose of pleading
estoppel because of laches.
3. Respondents can not rely upon the evidence introduced
by defendants Frank B. Bowers and wife which is the evidence upon which the court rendered its judgment.
4. Respondents failed to establish their title on which
judgment quieting title in them and awarding them possession of the property could be entered.
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IV.
ARGUMENT
Point l.
APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED TO HAVE HIS MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS GRANTED.
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WAS NO BAR TO
APPELLANT'S ACTION BUT WAS A BAR TO RESPONDENTS' DEFENSE AND COUNTER-CLAIM.
This is an equity action, a suit to quiet title and to recover possession of real property, together with the rents,
issues and profits therefrom. Appellant filed the usual short
form pleading alleging that he was the owner of the property
and in possession thereof and that defendants, R. L. Bird and
Mae C. Bird, his wife, Frank B. Bowers and Winnifred S.
Bowers, his wife, and all other persons unknown claiming
any right, title, etc. which follows the statute as to unknown
defendants, claimed some interest or title in and to the property, and prayed for judgment declaring appellant to be
the owner in fee simple of the property and adjudging the
defendants to have no estate or interest in said property.
Defendants and respondents Birds, answered appellant's
complaint denying title in appellant and claiming title in
themselves and alleging as one of the bases of their title
an auditor's deed issued to these defendants which deed is
based on a sale for delinquent taxes for the year 1928 on
which the Auditor's deed issued Mar. 13th, 1936. Respondents further plead Sees. 104-2-5 and 104-2-5.10 UCA
1943, as added b'y Chapters 18 and 19, Laws of Utah,
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19-13 as amended and Sec. 104-2-6 UCA, 19,1,3 as amended
by Laws of Utah, 1943, Chapter 20 as a bar to plaintiff's
action.
Appellant filed his reply to defendants Blrd's answer
and counter-claim denying the allegations contained in the
counter-claim and pleaded Sees. 104-2-5, 104-2-6 and
104-2-12, UCA 1943, and Sec. 104-2-5.10 Laws of Utah,
1947 a~ a bar to these defendants' and respondents' counterclaim.
Defendants Frank B. Bowers and Winnifred S. Bowers,
his wife, answered appellant's complaint denying title in
plaintiff and appellant and alleged that these defendants
are the owners of said property, all of which are but general allegations.
By his complaint, which is his third amended complaint,
plaintiff and appellant further alleged that he did, on the 9th
day of May, 1947 file an action to quiet title in him and
against defendants Birds which affected the property described
in plaintiff's complaint, which action was dismissed as to
defendants Birds without having been tried on its merits.
Which allegation was admitted by defendants Birds.
Defendants and respondents Birds filed their motion for
judgment on the pleadings as did plaintiff and respondent.
This court has held that motions for judgment on the
pleadings are not proper when applied for by a defendant to
the action and when filed it is treated as a general demurrer.
See Coburn v. Bartholomew, 50 Utah, 566 in which this
court in treating of such a motion said at page 570:
"Such a motion is not usual on the part of a defendant
unless it be where a defendant's counterclaim is either
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admitted or not denied, in which case his relation to
to the question is that of a plaintiff. A motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially a proceeding on the
part of a plaintiff. 23 Cyc. 769."
In the instant case appellant denied the allegations contained in respondents' counterclaim.
This case is that type of action which our legislature contemplated that Sees. 104-2-5, 104-2-5.10 and 104-2-6 UCA
1943 as amended and the new section 104-2-5.10 Laws of
Utah, 1947 would apply to, respondents' counterclaim not having been filed within either four years from the date of sale
of the property ( 1928) or within four years from the date of
the issuance of auditor's deed (Mar. 13, 1936). This fact
is evid~nced by the allegations contained in paragraph 8 of
defendants' Birds' affirmative defense which reflects the
fact that the tax sale bears date, December 21st, 1928 and
the auditor's deed bears date March 13th, 1936.
That part of Section 104-2-5.10 Laws of Utah, 1947 which
applies is as follows:
. . . "no counterclaim for the recovery of such property
or for the possession thereof shall be interposed
unless the same be brought or interposed within four
years from the date of such sale or within four years
from the date of the issuance of such auditor's deed."
From a reading of the above cited law it is evident that
respondents were required to file action or to set up a counterclaim to an action either on or before December 21st, 1932
which is four years from the date of the sale of the property,
or on or before March 13th, 1940, which is four years from
the date of the issuance of auditor's deed, otherwise respon-
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dents are not saved from the effect of the above statute. Respondent~ filed their answer and counterclaim on Feb. 4th,

1948.
The statutes apply differently and a distinction is made
between those actions involving only the recovery or posse5sion of land and those actions brought for the recovery
of real property held by a defendant under a tax deed.
As the instant case is one for the recovery of real property
held by defendants under a tax deed, we may eliminate from
consideration section 104-2-5, Laws of Utah, 1943 because
that section brings the case at bar under the provisions of
section 104-2-5.10, Laws of Utah, 1943, which is as follows:
Limitations of Actions-Real Estate Sold to County Under
Section 80-l 0-68-Four Years.
"No action for the recovery of re_?.l property struck
off and sold to the county, as provided by section
80-10-68 (6), Utah Code Annotated 1943 or for the
possession thereof shall be maintained and no defense or
counterclaim to any action involving the recovery of
property, or the defense of title to property, sold at
such tax sale, or public or private sale, or for possession
thereof shall be set up or maintained, unless the same be
brought or set up within four years from date on which
the sale was held. Provided, however, that an action
may be maintained or defense set up within four years
from the effective date of this act with respect to real
property sold prior to said effective date."
(The effective date of this act is May lith, 1943)
As to appellant's action, his complaint was filed on
May 9th 1947 which was within the four 'year period provided for by the above cited act. However respondents' answer, defense and counterclaim were not filed as hereinbefore
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pointed out, until Feb. 4th, 1948, which was approximately
nine months after the four year period of limitations. Therefore appellant was saved by his timely filing of his action,
while respondents were not within time, all because the property was sold prior to the effective date of the act, auditor's
deed having issued Mar. 13th, 1936 based on tax sale for taxes
of the year 1928.
As is herein pointed out, appellant is saved from the
running of the statute, the act of 1943 and also as this section
is amended by section 104-2-5.10, Laws of Utah, 1947, having brought his action May 9, 1947 or two days before the
effective date of the 1943 act (May II, 1943, plus 4 years,
May 11, 1947). Therefore the first part of the 1943 act
herein above quoted has no application as against the rights
of appellant but applies only as against respondent. Said
act' is a bar to respondents' defense and counterclaim inasmuch as respondents' defense and counterclaim were neither
one filed within the four year period.
For the same reason, respondents' counterclaim and defense are also barred by section 104-2-6 Laws of Utah, 1943,
which is as follows:
"104-2-6. Limitation of Actions-Real Estate-Seizen and
Possession within Seven Years, Exception
Property Held Under Tax Deed.
"No cause of action, or defense or counterclaim to an
action, founded upon the title to real property or to
rents or profits out of the same, shall be effectual,
unless it appears that the person prosecuting the action,
or interposing the defense or counterclaim, or under
whose title the action is prosecuted or defense or counterclaim is made, or the ancestor, predecessor or grantor
of such person was seised or possessed of the property
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in question within seven years before the comm1ttmg
of the act in respect to which such action is prosecuted
or defense or counterclaim made; pr01?ided, however,
that with respect to actions involving real property held
under tax deed, the action must be brought or defense
or counterclaim interposed within the time prescribed by
section 104-2-5.10 of this code."
The above section invokes the provisions of section 104-2-5.10
in those actions where the property is held under tax deed.
Section 104-2-6 above cited applying to possession of
property in all cases excepting where the property is held
under tax deed brings up the question of possession, not
as the same affects the rights of appellant, but as the rights
of respondents are effected. Appellant pleaded that he and
his predecessors in interest were in possession of the property
for in excess of 20 years. Respondents' right of possession
was questioned at all times from the date they received their
deed, on Sept. 5th, 1945. Respondents claimed no possession or right to possession prior to Sept. 5th, 1945, therefore they could not rely and did not rely upon the seven
year statute.
Respondents cannot claim possession through any predecessor in interest based on their tax title as has been held by
this court in the case of Bozievich v Slechta, found in 166
P2d at page 239, this because the County never at any time
had a tenant in possession of the property during the period
which the county held tax title to the property.
In the Bozievich case at page 241 the court said:
"Issuance of an auditor's tax deed did not give the
county possession. It was the act of placing tenants
in actual possession which initiated possession by the
county."
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There is no evidence in this record showing that the
county had a tenant in possession of the property at any
time.
Appellant established by the evidence the fact that fee
title to the property vested in him which carries with it the
presumption that appellant was entitled to possession and was
in actual possession as was held by this court in the case of
Gibson v. McGurrin et al. 37 U. 158 in which the court
said:
"One who claims the title to property and brings an
action to quiet title, under Comp. Laws 1907 Sec.
3511, providing that an action may be brought by any
person against another who claims an estate or interest
in real property, adverse to him, to determine such
adverse claim, need not prove that he is in possession,
or entitled thereto, but it is sufficient if he establishes
that the legal title is in him, and that defend~nts have
no right, title, or interest adverse to him in the premises.
On proof by plaintiff in an acion to quiet title, that
the legal title is in him, the law presumes that he was
in constructive possession; and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it will be presumed that he was
entitled to the actual possession of the land in controversy, and proof that the legal title is in plaintiff is
sufficient to support a finding that he is entitled to
possession."
Now it appears that the purpose of all of the statutes of
limitations as herein referred to and as pleaded by both
appellant and respondents is to compel fee owners who lose
their property through tax sales to take action within four
years from the date of sale to the county and also require the
tax title purchaser to bring his action within a period of four
years. That is to say, the purpose of the enactment by the
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legislature appears to be to put the titles at rest by freezing
conditions as they exist after a period of four years and
while this might appear to place a tremendous premium on
possession to the land, still it appears to be reasonable that
unless a person pursues his remedy within a period of four
years he shall be considered to have abandoned it.
With the evidence as pleaded by the respective parties
before the court, appellant's motion for judgment on the
pleading should have been granted.

Point 2.

THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETIONARY POWER IN REFUSING TO PERMIT APPELLANT TO AMEND
HIS COMPLAINT AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE
TRIAL OF SAID CAUSE FOR THE PURPOSE OF
PLEADING ESTOPPEL BECAUSE OF LACHES.
Appellant requested leave to amend his complaint at
the commencement of the trial of the case on motion, which
motion was denied by the trial court. The amendment proposed by appellant would not have injected into the case a
new or different cause of action, neither was the amendment
as proposed such that it would have taken additional time
for respondents to gather evidence to rebut or deny the allegation as proposed. It was not an amendment which would
be supported by evidence but was founded solely upon a
legal principal, and would have permitted a complete adjudication of the matter in controversy; it would have been
in furtherance of justice to have permitted the amendment.
As it was, it was an obstruction of justice to have denied the
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amendment. Appellant was prejudiced by the ruling of the
court.
This court has repeatedly held that amendments to
pleadings, particularly if made prior to the trial of the cause
should be granted with liberality, in fact this court has
consistently encouraged all proper amendments to pleadings
to the end of having a full hearing on the merits of the
entire controversy.
See Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v Clegg, (Utah)
135 P2d 919.
Hancock v Luke, 46 Utah 26, 148 P. 452,
Harman v Yeager, 100 Utah 30, 110 P2d 352
In the Hartford Accident Case this Court quoted from the
New York case of Harriss v Tams, 258 N.Y. 229, 242, 179
N. E. 476, as follows:
"The power to permit amendments is denied only if a
change is made in the liability sought to be enforced
against the defendant."
The amendment should have been allowed and appellant
should have been permitted to urge his proposed estoppel.

Point 3.
RESPONDENTS CANNOT RELY UPON THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED BY DEFENDANTS FRANK B.
BOWERS AND WIFE WHICH IS THE EVIDENCE
UPON WHICH THE COURT RENDERED ITS DECISION.
Respondents adopted as their evidence, the testimony
introduced over the objection of appellant, of V. Lynn Han-
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sen, a witness called to testify on behalf of defendants Frank
B. Bowers and his wife.
Witness Hansen was permitted to testify over the objection of appellant to the fact that the deed given to him by
Bowers Investment Company, the owner of the fee simple title
in 1928 was given and received by him as security for
monies owed to him and not for the purpose of conveying
title. Appellant made timely objection to this evidence and
gave as his reasons for the objection the fact that appellant
was taken by surprise, that the evidence injected into the case
a new issue which appellant was not prepared to meet. There
was not one word contained in the pleadings of the fact
that the deed given by Bowers Investment Company to Hansen was given as security only. As has been pointed out
heretofore, Bowers Investment Company was not even a
party to the action, neither was Bowers lnv~stment Company
represented at the tri~l of the case. Counsel for Frank B.
Bowers urged the fact that the deed shown in the chain of
title from Hansen to Frank B. Bowers had the effect of
a reconveyance of the property originally conveyed by
Bowers Investment Company, the corporation, the original
grantor and owner, to Hansen. Such a contention is
absolutely rediculous, but even so, it apparently influenced
the trial court's decision. Hansen testified to the fact
that in 1937 he was a paint contractor employed as a
painter for Bowers Investment Company and Frank B. Bowers (Tr. 18) and because Mr. Bowers, (not Bowers Investment Company) was indebted to Hansen at that time, Mr.
Bowers gave Hansen the deed to the property, (Tr. 18 and
19).
Now Mr. Hansen could not testify with certainty even
with the help of his counsel to the fact that the deed which
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the court received in evidence was in fact the deed given to
him by Mr. Bowers as security for the indebtedness, (Tr. 20).
There is no question from the testimony of witness Hansen of the fact that if there was an indebtedness, it was Frank
B. Bowers and not the corporation who was indebted to
him ( Tr. 20) . If however, the court is of the opinion that
there was an indebtedness owing by the corporation to Hansen at the time the deed was given, then witness Hansen
admitted that at the time he received the deed he satisfied the
obligation at least in part ( Tr. 25). Witness Hansen also
testified to the fact that at the time he delivered the deed to
Frank B. Bowers he was sure he received consideration for
the deed, that money passed between them, which testimony
is as follows as found on page 28 of the transcript:

Q Now at the time you gave a deed back to Frank B.
Bowers of this same property, do you recall that transaction
Mr. Hansen?

A I don't recall it very clearly. xxx I certainly don't
remember the specific time. I am sure I did it.

Q Do you remember what consideration took place
between you?

A. No sir.

Q Do you recall whether any money passed from Mr.
Bowers to you at that time?
A Well I am sure that it did.
Q. You are sure that it did. Your negotiations at
that time were with Frank B. Bowers, were they?
A Yes.
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No explanation was made or even attempted to be
made to show why the deed which was given by V. Lynn
Hansen to Frank B. Bowers was not recorded for over 10
years (Tr. 20). Frank B. Bowers did not explain why he
failed to pay taxes on the property during all those years,
and during which time Frank B. Bowers held the deed unrecorded. Not until after the recording of the deed from
V. Lynn Hansen to appellant did Frank B. Bowers record his
deed.
It is contended and we think the evidence clearly shows
that the property, being at the time situated near the business
section of town and having been assessed with general and
special assessments which accrued to a substantial sum, so
much so that neither Bowers lnv. Co., V. Lynn Hansen, or
Frank B. Bowers were willing to pay these taxes, that the
property was abandoned and after so many years it is possible that Hansen forgot that he held title to the property.
Hansen of course wanted to disclaim any interest in the
property. He did not want to assume and pay all of the
taxes which were assessed against the property. This court
will, we think, take judicial notice of the fact that a stranger
to a title is in a much more favored position when he takes
property over after it has been sold for general and special
taxes, than is the owner of the fee title. The stranger may
redeem or buy in the property for a small percentage of the
amount of taxes owing whereas the owner of the fee title
cannot do so, therefore Hansen was not interested in the
property, being obliged to pay the delinquent assessments. Not until the values of property generally increased
was anyone interested in this property.
Respondents contended at the trial of the case that the
consideration paid by appellant was unconscionable and was
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not valuable consideration for the deed but the evidence as
shown by the testimony of appellant is to the effect that
when appellant negotiated with Hansen for the purchase of
the property, appellant was informed of the fact that the
property had been sold for taxes and that special assessments had been levied in a substantial sum against the
property.
The court found that appellant was put on notice of the
fact that Hansen held title to the property as security and
that the appellant was not a bona fide purchaser of the
property for value, hut there is no evidence in the record to
support such a finding. Not one word of evidence. Appellant testified to the fact, which is undisputed, that he relied
upon the county records in negotiating with Hansen for the
deed to the property, that he found title to the property in
Hansen and so informed Hansen, and that the property was
subject to unpaid general and special taxes since the year
1928. Hansen did not advise appellant at any one of his
conferences of the fact that he held the property as security
only and that the deed held by him was in fact a mortgage;
the record is wholly lacking of such evidence. Hansen did
not testify to the fact that he so advised appellant.
The testimony of Mr. Hansen as to his meeting with
appellant as found on page 23 of the transcript is to the
effect that Mr. Pender called on Hansen and asked for a quit
claim deed. Mr. Hansen called his attorney. Hansen told
appellant that he (Hansen) did not own the property. There
were several contacts had between appellant and Hansen
and Hansen did not accept the first offer made by appellant
(Tr. 28). Appellant testified to the fact that there was
nothing said at any one of the conversations had with
Hansen to the effect that Hansen did not own the property
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but that all negotiations and conversations were regarding
the price to be paid by appellant. (Tr. 39). This was not
denied by Hansen.
While Respondents contend that the consideration paid
by appellant to Hansen for the quit claim deed is uncon~
scionable and it is evident that respondents convinced the
trial court of this fact, still respondents do not consider it
unconscionable for them to take the property which they
endeavored to prove has such great value, upon payment
by respondents of the sum of $350 for the county tax deed
and the sum of $910.00 for the city deed. Attention is
invited to the fact that not only did the city deed cover the
property affected by these proceedings but it covered other
properties also. This court will, we think, take judicial
notice of the fact that before appellant can acquire good
title to the property free and clear of tax liens, appellant
must redeem and pay off these taxes. Such has been the law
as laid down by this court in equity actions in numerous
cases some of which cases are those of Utah Lead Co. v
Piute County, 65 P2d 1199 in which this court said:
"The title to parcel No. 2 be quieted in plaintiff
subject to his paying to Young all legitimate taxes
assessed against said property paid by him, together
with costs and penalties paid by the latter with interest
on such payments to time of consummation of decree."
and in Burton v Hoover (Utah) 74 P2d 652 in which case the
court said:
"For the reason stated, the judgment in favor of
defendant is reversed, but as the plaintiff has invoked
the aid of a court of equity to vacate the tax deeds, he
must do equity, and at least to the extent to which the
attempted purchase by defendant has relieved his prop-
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erty of liens, he must as a condition to obtaining such
relief, reimburse the defendants, together with interest
on such amount at the legal rate from the date of payment until repaid."
in the Burton case the court cited the cases of Oregon Short
LineR. Co. v Hallock 41 U 378, 126 P. 394.
Holland v Hotchkiss, 162 Cal. 366, 123 P. 258, L.R.A.
1915 c., 492
and the Utah Lead case herein above cited.
Because of the law as laid down by this honorable court
and because of the fact that as appellant testified, appellant
was aware of the fact that there were unpaid and delinquent
general and special assessments against the property, it is
evident that appellant will be required to pay a larger consideration for the property in order to clear his title than
would respondents, therefore respondents argument is unsound. There is no evidence supporting the courts finding that
because Hansen conveyed for a nominal consideration appellant was put upon notice. We ask, who complains about
this unconscionable price paid by appellant? No one other
than the tax title purchasers.
It was contended by respondents that appellant was
further put upon notice of the fact that Hansen had no title
because Hansen conveyed by quit claim deed and therefore
appellant was not a bona fide purchaser for value. The trial
court in its finding No. 12 found that plaintiff knew that V.
Lynn Hansen and Milia Hansen were not the owners of the
land described in finding No. 1; (which is the property
affected by the action) and that plaintiff was not a bona
fide purchaser for value. For the court to so find robs the
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recording act of its virtues as is said by Pomeroy in his
Equity Jurisprudence Vol. 2, at Sec. 754 in which we find
the following:
"The taking of a quit claim deed does not negative
presumption of good faith," (footnote)
and Sec. 754 is as follows:
"Some of the ablest text writers and jurists of this
country hold to the view that a grantor cannot by any
form of deed do more than convey all his right, title
and interest; that a quit-claim will convey a perfect
fee-simple title, just as effectually as a warranty deed,
if in fact the grantor at the time of executing the deed
has such a title; that a quit claim deed no more implies that the grantor doubts the goodness of his title
than a warranty deed implies that the grantor considers the title unsafe without the support of covenants
and assurances involving personal liability for damages; and that a purchaser who relies upon the public
records showing a clear title in the grantor, even though
he takes a. quitclaim deed, cannot be denied the character of a bona fide purchaser without robbing the recording acts of their virtue."
This view has received the sanction of the United States
Courts.
As has heretofore been pointed out, the property affected
by this action was at all times vacant, it was not under
cultivation, it was not enclosed by a fence, there was nothing
of a physical nature which ~ould suggest ownership in anyone
other than the record owner.
The trial court's having held that appellant had notice
of the fact that Hansen did not own the property is wholly con-
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trary to the evidence. Even the deed by which Hansen
acquired title from Bowers Investment Company contained
a documentary internal revenue stamp importing consideration. This contradicts the fact that no consideration was
paid by Hansen and of course it was admitted that consideration was paid by Hansen in satisfying an obligation existing
between him and Bowers.
The fact that the deed from Bowers Investment Co. to
Hansen recited only a nominal consideration did not charge
appellant with notice of the fact that Hansen had no interest
in the property. Such is the law of this state as is given by
Sec. 78-l-6 Laws of Utah, 1945 which is as follows:

78-l-6 Acknowledgment-Recording-Notice.
"Every conveyance of real estate, and every instrument of writing setting forth an agreement to convey
any real estate or whereby any real esta!e may be
affected, to operate as notice to third persons shall he
proved or acknowledged and certified in the manner
prescribed by this title and recorded in the office of
the recorder of the county in which such real estate is
situated, hut shall be valid and binding between the
parties thereto without such proofs, acknowledgment,
certification or record, and as to all other persons who
have had actual notice. Neither the fact that an instrument, recorded as herein provided, recites only a nominal consideration, nor the fact that the grantee in such
instrument is designated as trustee, or that the conveyance otherwise purports to he in trust without naming
the beneficiaries or stating the terms of the trust shall
operate to charge any third person with notice of the
interest of any person or persons not named in such
instrument."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

33

If the facts of this case were as contended by respondents and as found by the court, why did not Bowers Investment Company, by its officers, or V. Lynn Hansen intervene
in the case and protect their interest, if any either had?
Neither appeared on their own behalf but total strangers to
the t.itle come into court and attempt to set aside conveyances for their own gain, and this as against a bona fide
purchaser of the fee title for value. It is clearly evident that
Frank B. Bowers claimed nothing in the premises and that if
he ever at any time claimed an interest that he abandoned that
interest in his not having recorded his deed received from
Hansen for in excess of 10 years, and in permitting the
property to go to tax sale for both general and special taxes
for so many years. That he now files his disclaimer is
evident of this fact.

NOTICE AS AFFECTING PRIORITY
As to the matter of whether from the evidence introduced in this case, appellant was put upon notice of fact as
contended, that Hansen had no title which he could convey to appellant. Even if it were competent which we do not
concede and provided it had been properly pleaded in order
to make it competent, there are not sufficient facts proven to
support such a fiinding. We find the following law and
authorities on this subject in support of this contention, to-wit:
Thompson on Real Property, Vol. 8, Sec. 4506--Reasonable diligence in inquiry, says:
"Only reasonable diligence in acquiring knowledge is required and this is held satisfied by the examination of the public records unless he has notice of
defects not disclosed by the records. {with numerous
cases cited)".
and Thompson says further in this same section:
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"It has been said that mere want of caution on
the part of the purchaser in making inquiry, as distinguished from fraudulent or wi~lful blindness, is not
sufficient to chaa'ge him with constructive notice."
There is no evidence in this case to the effect that appellant had notice of defects not disclosed by the records. Appellant did make inquiry of the record owner and the fact
that Hansen said he did not own the property which is denied
was not sufficient to put appellant on notice of fact that someone else owned the property when Hansen dict:t inform appellant. Many people will say they do not own property when
it has gone to tax deed over a period of many years and
especially may one such as appellant whom the evidence
shows has dealt in many tax title properties, assume that one
does not claim ownership of property after it has gone to tax
-sale. This is the usual position of fee owners. They consider
their property lost as a result of tax sales.
In 109 ALR at page 746 we find the law as follows on
the question of notice:
"It is well established that vague or general rumors, reports, surmises, covert insinuations, or general
assertions, based on hearsay and made by strangers or
those not interested in the property, as· to the existence
of a title or interest in some third person or persons
whose title or interest is not recorded, do not constitute
notice of title or interest in such third person, or impose upon a purchaser or mortgagee the duty of in. "
quzry.
The fact that Hansen said he did not own the property did not
impose the duty of further inquiry on appellant when he
knew the record title was in Hansen.
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The annotation above quoted also goes on at page 7 49
and says:
''A general report that there is an outstanding
claim or conveyance without defining what sort of
claim or to whom is not notice to the purchaser."
In the case of Hall v Livingston found in the above
annotation it being a case where a purchaser was told prior
to the purchase that it was understood the property was
charged with a trust, and the purchaser was not thereby
charged with notice, the court said;
"The notice, to affect him, must be more than
would excite the suspicion of a cautious and wary purchaser. It must have been so clear and undoubted, with
respect to the existence of the prior tight, as to make
it fraudulent in him, afterwards, to take and hold the
property."

and in Raymond v Flavel (Oregon), also found in the above
annotation, which is a case closely in point with the instant
case, it was held that a statement made to a prospective
purchaser, warning him against buying the land because
of the possibility of future trouble with persons claiming
an outstanding equity in the property, who afterwards
brought the action, was insufficient to affect his rights as a
bona fide purchaser, because the testimony, taken in its
strongest light, gave no suggestion of any fact of a tangible nature bearing any indication whatever of the existence of a secret trust in the property.
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PLEADING-ISSUE RAISED BY ANSWER SETTING
UP GENERAL DENIAL ONLY
Defendants Bowers attempted to prove equitable title in
them as did respondents Birds, for the purpose of defeating
plaintiff's title. Neither respondents Birds or defendants
Bowers pleaded facts sufficient to permit evidence on this
issue. Respondents' answer and counterclaim contains no
allegation on this matter and Defendants Bowers' answer
simply denjes title in plaintiff and alleges that they are
the owners of the property. Counsel for Bowers contended
that such general denial and allegation of ownership under
affirmative defense put in issue the title to the property by
virtue of which evidence of the fact that the deed given by
Bowers Investment Company to Hansen was in fact not a
deed but a mortgage and that the deed was taken as security
for an indebtedness.
Section 104-9-l UCA 1943 under pleadings (Answer)
provides:
"The answer of the defendant must contain:
(I ) General and special denial of each material
allegation, etc.
( 2) A statement of any new matter constituting a
defense or counterclaim."
and in 49 Corpus Juris, Sec. 223, at page 194. Equitable
Defenses, we find the law stated as follows:
"The general rule is that to be available, an
defense must be pleaded, and must contain
averments to satisfy all the requirements of a
in equity. It must state facts sufficient to
a defense."

equitable
sufficient
good bill
constitute
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In 51 Corpus Juris at page 234--Equitable title we find
the law stated as follows:
··Generally, defendant to avail himself of an equitable
title as against plaintiff's legal title, should specifically
plead it. ·An answer setting up an equitable interest
under a contract should allege the fairness of the contract and the adequacy of the consideration."
and at the same page under the subject Adverse Claim, it is
said:
'·It has been held that, in statutory proceedings to
determine adverse claims, defendant, relying on an
adverse claim in himself, must plead the nature of his
claim, although the nature of his claim need not be set
forth at length where this has already been done in the
complaint."
The court should not have permitted any evidence to
come into the record under the state of the pleadings to the
effect that Hansen took title to the property as security only
or that the deed was in fact a mortgage and not intended
to convey title to the property.

Point 4.
RESPONDENTS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THEIR
TITLE ON WHICH JUDGMENT QUIETING TITLE IN
THEM AND AWARDING THEM POSSESSION OF THE
PROPERTY COULD BE ENTERED.
We contend that defendants and respondents had no
meritorious defense and established no right to any judicial
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relief. Appellant conclusively established title in him. Respondents had the burden of going forward with evidence
to present a valid defense or some right to affirmative relief
under their counterclaim. See Gatrell v Salt Lake County,
106 Utah 409, 149 P.2d 827. Respondents offered no
evidence in support of their answer and counterclaim except
to show payment of taxes.
It was admitted by respondents at the trial of the case
that one of the auditor's affidavits was omitted from the
assessment rolls for the year for which the property was
sold to the county for delinquent general taxes. Therefore
respondents acquired nothing but a lien on the property for
the payment of taxes as has been the rule of this court repeatedly. This title failing, the only other color of title
which respondents had upon which to rely was that acquired
from the city. The abstract of title shows certificates of
sales for special assessments at entries No. 1 and No. 2 for
sidewalk assessments, and at entry No. 4 a certificate
of sale for paving assessments on which sales Recorder's
Deeds issued from the Treasurer to Salt Lake City, a municipal corporation, and on Feb. 26, 1946 Salt Lake City conveyed by Quit Claim Deed, the property affected by this action,
together with other properties, to respondents. Respondents
introduced no evidence as to the regularity of the proceedings
leading up to the sale of said property to Salt Lake City
for the special assessments. Counsel for respondents asked
counsel for appellant if he would stipulate as to the regularity of such proceedings which counsel for appellant refused
to do. (Tr. 11, 12, and 13).
The evidence shows that respondents, instead of taking
an assignment of the Certificate of sale for special taxes
from the city, redeemed the special taxes (See abstracter's
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certificate) and thus extinguished the lien of the special taxes,
and therefore it is our contention that the lien of the special
taxes having been extinguished, even if respondents had
proved by the evidence the regularity of the proceedings
leading up to the sale of the property for special taxes,
which they failed to do, respondents acquired nothing by the
quit claim deed from Salt Lake City.
We have no statute which makes a special tax proceeding prima facie evidence of the regularity of the proceeding
leading up to the sale of the property such as we have under
sales for general taxes.
This court has held that the failure of any one of the
prerequisties of a valid sale is as fatal to the sale as the
failure of all thereof. See Olsen v Bagley, 10 Utah 492,
Eastman v Gurry, 15 U. 410 and Crystal Car Line vs State
Tax Com. (Utah) 174 P2d 995.
It is our further contention that the lien f~r special
taxes is extinguished and this court has so held in the
cases of Petterson v Ogden City and Western Beverage Co.
v Hansen in each of which cases it was said that where after
a lien for special improvements had accrued there was levied
a general tax against such property which was sold to satisfy
the latter tax, the sale for general taxes extinguished the municipal lien for special improvement taxes.
It is evident that the lien for special improvements had
accrued in the instant case prior to 1928; the certificate of
sale bears date Apr. 20, 1928. The Tax Sale for general
taxes bears date of Dec. 21, 1928. Therefore the property
was sold to satisfy the tax of 1928 and the sale thus made
extinguished the lien for special improvement taxes, therefore
respondents' special tax title could be of no force or effect.
Attention is invited to the fact that appellant's action
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was filed prior to the effective date of the 1947 act making
general and special tax liens equal.
In line with the decisions of this court, because appellant
has invoked the aid of a court of equity to vacate the tax
deeds, he is willing to do equity, but in so doing appellant
should be required to pay only the amount found necessary
to relieve the property of the lien of the general tax, being
the sum of $350.00 together with interest on said amount
from the 5th day of September, 1945, the day on which the
deed issued from Salt Lake County, to respondents together
with taxes subsequently assessed and paid by respondents
less rental value of the property. We think our position
as herein expressed finds support in the following decisions
of this court, to-wit:
Burton v Hoover, (Utah) 74P2d 652.
Tree v White, (Utah) 171 P2d 398.
Peterson v Weber County, (Utah) 103 P2d 652
and particularly the cases of Petterson v Ogden City 176
P2d 599,
and Western Beverage Co. vs Hansen,
98 Utah 332, 96 P2d 1105.
Wherefore appellant prays that the judgment and decree
entered herein he vacated and that appellant have judgment
quieting title against respondents upon paying to respondents
such sum or sums as may be found to be equitable, and
for an order requiring respondents to surrender possession
of the premises to appellant and for an accounting of rents
for the period of time during which respondents have had

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

41
the use of said property which sum shall be credited to the
taxes found to be owing by appellant to respondents; also for
costs including costs on this appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
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